experiment in which 17 subjects were scanned during
). This pattern of behavior, switching to defection as the end of the game approaches, has been predicted on theoretical grounds (Axelrod, 1984) and observed empirically in previous studies (Andreoni and Miller, 1993) . In games played with the provocative human confederate, the frequency of mutual cooperation was lower and mutual defection higher ( Figure 2B ). Because the "tit-for-tat" computer strategy initiated the game with defection, mutual cooperation was uncom- common outcome in games played with presumed human partners for Experiment 2 ( Figures 2D and 2E ). In these games, the observed reduction in mutual cooperaeach of three game sessions, focusing specifically on tion in rounds 18-20 was forced by the computer strathuman versus computer interaction.
egy, which defected automatically in these rounds. The In both experiments, the players interacted via a netrebound of mutual cooperation in rounds 20-23 (Figure worked computer that accepted the responses from the 2D) was induced by programmed cooperation by the player inside the scanner (player A) and the nonscanned computer in these three rounds. When subjects in Explaying partner (player B). Each Prisoner's Dilemma periment 2 were instructed that they were playing the game consisted of at least 20 rounds, with each round game with a computer rather than another person, mulasting 21 s ( Figure 1B ). During the first 12 s of each tual cooperation was less common throughout the game round, both players independently selected either to ( Figure 2F ; paired t ϭ 4.90, 19 df, p Ͻ 0.001), even though cooperate or defect. At 12 s, the square of the matrix subjects were actually playing against exactly the same where the two choices intersected was highlighted to computer strategy. reveal each player's choice and the resulting payoff for
In both experiments, there was a tendency for subject that round. Subjects were compensated in direct propairs who arrived at a CC outcome to persist with mutual portion to their accumulated earnings. The outcome was cooperation so that a CC outcome in the current round displayed for 9 s, and then the next round began (Figure was most likely to be followed by a CC outcome in the 1B). Functional images were collected every 3 s. We next (Table 2) . analyzed both the BOLD response to the game outcome and the BOLD response during the decision-making pefMRI Data riod of each round. For the former, we examined the Neural Activations Related to the Reaction to the response for the epoch between 12 and 21 s. For the Game Outcome (Seconds 12-21 of Each Round) latter, we examined the 6 s epoch preceding the button The BOLD response to a given outcome type (i.e., CC, press signaling a choice to cooperate or defect in each CD, DC, or DD) could be attributable to an effect of round.
either the partner's choice, the player's choice, or to an interaction between the two that exceeded the sum of Results their respective main effects. The statistical interaction is of special interest because it relates specifically to Prisoner's Dilemma Game Behavior the social interaction rather than to independent effects The number of occurrences of each outcome type was of player and partner decisions. Therefore, we began a function of the two players' choices and so was not by testing for main effects of player and partner choices specified in advance. Table 1 shows the average number and for an interaction between the two. More specifiof each outcome type per session for both experiments.
cally, for the games in which player A assumed she was In Experiment 1, mutual cooperation was the most playing with a human partner, we examined the main common outcome when the playing partner was a beeffect of player A's decision (irrespective of player B's haviorally unconstrained woman (see Experimental Prodecision) on neural activity in player A during the reaccedures for details of experimental design). However, tion epoch (seconds 12-21 for each round), the main in the final rounds of the game, the frequency of mutual effect of player B's decision (irrespective of player A's cooperation decreased, and mutual defection increased decision) on neural activity in player A, and the interaction effect of player A and player B's decisions on neural activity in player A. We then calculated the same contrast for Experiment Figure 4C ). On the other hand, CC and DD are more stable in the This distribution differed significantly from chance (chisense that subjects often persist with these outcomes. square ϭ 26.8, p Ͻ 0.001). In 25 of the 30 sessions where Hence, CC and DD outcomes might be considered be-CC had the largest fitted response, that response was haviorally reinforcing. In terms of spatial extent, the positive. In other words, CC was associated with inlargest activation for this interaction involving symmetric creased activation relative to the other conditions, rather social behavior is in the anteroventral striatum and subthan less deactivation. Though not as pronounced, there genual anterior cingulate cortex (BA 25). The striatal was also evidence of deactivation for the CD and DC activation includes the caudate nucleus and nucleus outcomes at this location ( Figure 4C ). In 19 of the 23 accumbens (Nac), both of which receive midbrain dopacases where CD had the smallest fitted response, that mine projections known to be involved with processing response was negative, and the DC response was negareward (Schultz, 1998) . The ventromedial/orbitofrontal tive in 21 of the 23 cases where DC had the smallest cortex (OFC), another brain area involved in reward profitted response. cessing (Rolls, 1999) , was also activated for the interacFor the peak voxel in the OFC ROI (see Figure 3) , CC tion (Figure 3) . had the largest fitted response for 32 of the 61 sessions (versus 15 for DD, 7 for CD, and 7 for DC), and 24 of these were positive in amplitude. This distribution also larger and more significant activations in ventromedial Activations are for Experiment 2 (p Ͻ 0.01, n ϭ 17 subjects) after limiting the search volume to voxels that survived a statistical threshold p Ͻ 0.01 in Experiment 1 (n ϭ 19 subjects). Activations consisting of fewer than five contiguous voxels are not reported. L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere.
frontal cortex and anteroventral striatum than were next round. In our experiments, CC outcomes tended to occur in consecutive strings so that a CC outcome found for the interaction analysis (Table 4 ; Figure 5A ). In contrast to the interaction t map, the activation in the in one round was most likely to be followed by a CC outcome in the next (Table 2) . Thus, the intervals followventromedial frontal cortex extended dorsally into the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (BA32). In Figures 5C ing CC outcomes typically involved a decision to continue cooperating, rather than defect. To more systematand 5D, the statistical parametric map for this contrast is displayed on a spatially normalized EPI image to demically investigate neural activity related to opting for social cooperation, a model was specified that comonstrate that the observed ventromedial frontal/orbitofrontal activation is not within an area of high magnetic pared the BOLD signal in the 6 s interval immediately preceding the choice to cooperate or defect (as marked susceptibility artifact. Figure 6 is an event-related plot for one subject for the peak voxel of the OFC ROI.
by a button press), and analyzed as a function of the partner's decision in the previous round. The four condi-
CC Compared with Monetary Reinforcement
To investigate the possibility that this pattern of activations were XC,CX (i.e., choosing to cooperate after the partner had cooperated in the previous round), XC,DX tion was simply a consequence of monetary reinforcement ($2 for a CC outcome), we tested for a condition (i.e., choosing to defect after the partner had cooperated in the previous round), XD,CX (i.e., choosing to cooper-(human partner versus control) by monetary outcome ($2 versus others) interaction in Experiment 1. That is, ate after the partner had defected in the previous round, and XD,DX (i.e., choosing to defect after the partner had we asked whether earning $2 when playing with a human partner produced more activation than earning $2 in defected in the previous round). The decision to cooperate following a cooperative the nonsocial control condition. The test for interaction revealed activation in the anteroventral striatum and choice by one's partner in the previous round activated the left anterior caudate and the right post-central gyrus OFC ( Figure 5E ). Thus, the anteroventral striatum, rACC, and OFC were activated more by reciprocated social (Table 6 ; Figure 7 ). The decision to reciprocate cooperation was also associated with activation in two regions cooperation than by a $2 reward in a nonsocial context.
CC with Computer versus Human
that were activated following mutual cooperation in the reaction epoch: the rostral anterior cingulate cortex and Playing Partners Finally, sessions with computer playing partners were the anteroventral striatum (Table 6 ; Figure 7 ). included in both experiments to determine whether activations detected with human partners were specific to human social interaction. In both experiments, mutual cooperation with a computer playing partner activated regions of the ventromedial/orbital frontal cortex (BA 11) that were also activated with human playing partners (Table 5) , although for Experiment 1, the overlap was only observed if the t statistic threshold was decreased to p Ͻ 0.05. In neither of the two experiments did mutual cooperation with a computer activate the rostral anterior cingulate or the anteroventral striatum observed for human playing partners.
Neural Activation Related to Social Decision Making (6 s Epoch Preceding the C or D Choice)
Given that subjects make their choices early (mean ϭ 
Discussion
relate to the rewarding effects of arranging and/or experiencing a mutually cooperative social interaction.
Recent evidence indicates that reward-related neural Reaction Epoch
Postscan subject interviews revealed that mutual coopactivity is greater for unpredicted than predicted rewards (Schulz et. al., 1997). Our results are consistent eration was typically considered the most personally satisfying outcome. The more profitable DC outcome with this observation insofar as subjects exerted no control over their partners' decisions so that the game outwas typically described as less desirable than CC outcomes either because it provoked guilt over having profcome always had an element of unpredictability. A subject could never know for certain if her cooperative ited at the partner's expense, or because subjects realized that the outcome would likely provoke defection choice would be reciprocated. However, when subjects choose to cooperate, they are guessing that their partner by the partner, thereby destabilizing the relationship and leading to lower cumulative earnings. Combined with the will do the same; and when their cooperation is met with defection, an anticipated reward is omitted. striatum in our experiment ( Figure 4C ). DC was also often evolved in the service of preserving social relationships based on reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Frank, 1988 ). This associated with striatal deactivation, an observation that could be reconciled with predictions if subjects find DC agrees with the everyday observation that we often behave altruistically toward others simply because we like more aversive than DD (they defect to protect themselves from potential exploitation by a defecting partner them, not because we consciously calculate that they are likely to reciprocate in the future. but experience guilt upon realizing a DC outcome).
Cooperating is always risky given the unpredictability Subjects who find the CC outcome rewarding would be expected to persist with CC outcomes more than of the intentions of another person in a social dyad. So, it is possible that the observed pattern of activation other subjects. We were therefore interested in whether the magnitude of the activation in the anteroventral striarelates more generally to a realization of success following a risky decision and not specifically to a reciprocated tum and OFC was related to subjects' tendencies to persist with CC outcomes. Indeed, subject's who were act of altruism. Alternatively, it may be the case that the observed activation is associated with positive feelings more likely to experience consecutive CC outcomes had greater activation in the peak voxel of the anteroventral toward one's partner; that activation of anteroventral striatum and OFC can result in feelings of trust and striatum ROI (r ϭ 0.70; p ϭ 0.002, Figure 5B ). There was no such behavioral correlation for the peak voxel of the comradery that reinforce the cooperative act, superseding any conscious recognition that material gains will OFC ROI.
Comparisons between human and computer activaflow from mutual cooperation. Indeed, some theorists have proposed that many of the social emotions have tion patterns show that the orbitofrontal activation asso- ciated with CC outcomes is not specific to rewarding tions are formed. Thus, one possible interpretation of this activation is that it is related to a representation of human social interaction but can also be elicited by interactive computer programs, at least when the latter a somatic state of an emotional experience that follows mutual cooperation. are programmed to be responsive to their partner's behavior. On the other hand, cooperation with a human partner may be a more effective stimulus for striatal
Decision Making
The decision to cooperate following cooperation by mechanisms related to reward since we did not observe striatal activation in association with CC for computer one's partner in the previous round was associated with activation in the right post-central gyrus. The post-cenpartners.
Finally, we note that the most significant activation in tral gyrus activation is in primary somatosensory cortex and could be a neural representation of a somatic reassociation with the CC outcome was in neither the OFC nor striatum, but in somatosensory association cortex sponse to an imagined decision to reciprocate cooperation (Damasio, 1994; Aziz et. al., 2000). in the medial posterior parietal lobe (BA 7; see Table 4 and Figure 5A) . A prominent theory of emotion processing
The anteroventral striatum was also activated for this contrast (i.e., XC,CX versus others). Our social decisionproposes that a neural representation of an organism's somatic state is an important referent of emotional expemaking epoch (for round n ϩ 1) trails but overlaps with the reaction epoch (to round n), raising the possibility rience (Bechara et. al., 2000) , and that somatosensory association cortex is largely where these representathat the anteroventral striatal activation represents pro- longed responses to the CC outcome that extend into to emotions (Davidson, 2000) . Its involvement with emotion is also supported by multiple neuroimaging studies our decision-making epoch. However, it is also possible that some of the activations in Table 6 relate specifically (Drevets and Raichle, 1998). Thus, the observed rostral anterior cingulate activation may reflect the emotional to social decision making. For example, the anterior cingulate cortex is involved in the detection of cognitive tone of social decision making. The decision to continue cooperating following a CC conflict (Cohen et. al., 2000) . The decision to persist with cooperation may involve conflict given the ever present outcome in the previous round also requires overcoming a putative bias that humans and other animals have to temptation to defect and earn an extra dollar. However, processing of cognitive conflict has been linked with weight the attractiveness of a reward in inverse proportion to its delay (Chun and Herrnstein, 1967), a bias that the caudal anterior cingulate, known as its cognitive division, whereas the cingulate activation we report here would encourage our subjects to value the immediate reward of defection and its $3 payoff more than the is in rostral anterior cingulate cortex (Bush et. al., 2000) . Nevertheless, conflict based on emotional interference delayed reward from sustained mutual cooperation. In other words, persisting with mutual cooperation rereportedly activates the rostral ACC (Whalen et. al., 1998), and it has been hypothesized that this region may quires restraining the impulse to defect and achieve immediate gratification. Accumulating evidence implibe generally involved with processing conflict related sive in all human societies and generally emerge from Prior to each run, subjects were reminded whom they would be relationships based on reciprocal altruism. Such relaplaying with (the partner's name, a "preprogrammed computer strategy," or the "control task"). We hypothesized that the confederate tionships arguably lay the foundation for the interdepenrun would be more provocative if it followed a run with a typically dence upon which societal division of labor is based. less provocative (i.e., more cooperative) human partner. Therefore, We have identified a pattern of neural activation that we used a fixed order for runs. In attempting to control for the may be involved in sustaining cooperative social relapotential confounds related to task novelty (e.g., anxiety associated tionships, perhaps by labeling cooperative social interwith the very first run of the experiment), the control scan was placed actions as rewarding, and/or by inhibiting the selfish first rather than last for 9 of the 16 subjects.
impulse to accept but not reciprocate an act of altruism.
Experiment 2
In each of three sessions, subjects played against the same preproExperimental Procedures grammed computer strategy that made cooperate or defect choices according to probabilities derived from the behavior of the unconSubjects The mean age of the 19 female participants in Experiment 1 was strained human subjects from the first experiment. That is, behavioral data from the unconstrained human subjects who played out-28.8 years (range 20-60 years). The mean age of the 17 female participants in Experiment 2 was 23.8 years (range 20-30). The subside the scanner in Experiment 1 were used to calculate the probability that a person would cooperate, as a function of the ject pool was restricted to women because of published reports that men and women play the game differently, particularly in the outcome of the previous two rounds of the game. Thus, a different probability was calculated for each of the 16 possible contingencies presence of a male experimenter (Hottes and Kahn, 1974; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Skotko et al., 1974) .
(e.g., CC,CC; CC,CD; … DD,DD). In all three games, the computer was programmed to defect automatically in rounds 18-20 in order Prior to scanning, all participants completed a 10 min computer tutorial, complete with examples, intended to familiarize them with to ensure sufficient non-CC outcomes for statistical analysis. To protect against the possibility of subjects recognizing a predictable the Prisoner's Dilemma game and with appropriate strategies for maximizing earnings. Specifically, it was pointed out that two playstrategy that always defected on the last three rounds, game one included an additional three rounds (21-23) in which the computer ers would both earn $40 if they both cooperated each round, but only $20 if they both defected each round. They were also told that always cooperated. In two of the three sessions, subjects were told that their playing partner was one of two women whom they had one would earn $60 and the other $0 in the unlikely event that one player cooperated each round and the other defected each round. just previously met. In a third session, they were told the playing partner would be a computer. The first game was open ended in Subsequently, all players completed a two question multiple-choice quiz designed to assess their comprehension of the game. For subthe sense that subjects were not told how many rounds the game would consist of.
We included an open-ended game to control for jects who answered one or both questions incorrectly, efforts were brain activations related to anticipating the game's end. For the two ing partners. The latter includes data for both the session with the unconstrained and confederate human partners from Experiment 1 remaining games, subjects were told in advance that each would consist of 20 rounds, with one game played with a human playing
and both the open-ended and closed sessions from Experiment 2. partner and the other with a computer partner. The order of the two sessions was counterbalanced. The identity of the playing partner
